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Abstract
This paper introduces the classical idea about the so-called ‘directed ’ and ‘induced ’ technical
change (ITC) within a Keynesian demand-side and evolutionary endogenous growth model in
order to analyze the interplay among technical change, long-run economic growth and functional
income distribution. An ITC process is analyzed within an Agent-Based Stock-Flow Consistent
(AB-SFC) model, wherein credit-constrained heterogeneous firms choose both the intensity and
the direction of the innovation towards a labor- or capital-saving choice of technique. In the long-
run, the model reproduces the so-called ‘Kaldor stylized facts’ (i.e. with a purely labor-saving
technical change), however during the transitional phase the model shows a labor-saving/capital-
using innovation pattern, as the aggregate output-capital ratio decreases until it stabilizes in the
long-run, as well as declining labor share for long time periods and we can ascribe these evidences
mainly to the directed technical change process. In order to stress the effective role of the
innovation bias on the model dynamics, we compare the baseline scenario with a ‘counterfactual ’
scenario wherein a ‘neutral ’ technical progress is at work.
JEL classification: E24, E25, O30, O35, O41.
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Since the inception of classical political economy the effect of technological progress upon long-
run economic growth and the distribution of income among social classes represents a crucial ques-
tion. For many years the bearings for modern theory of economic growth and distribution have
been the empirical regularities known as ‘Kaldor stylized facts’ (Kaldor 1957), and in particular
the constancy of aggregate output-capital ratio and of distributive shares.
However, over the last few decades we have observed a persistent decline in the wage share together
with moderate growth of real wages (especially compared to the pace of labor productivity growth)
and different pattern of output-capital ratio in advanced economies.
The social and economic consequences of declining labor share, growing capital-output ratio1 and
different pattern of the rate of profit have been brought to the center of economic debate by Piketty’s
book (2014) and his analysis about inequalities and capital concentration in a weak growth sce-
nario in advanced economies. The declining pattern of aggregate wage share is nowadays at the
core of economic and political economy debate about the interplay among technological change,
wage-bargaining, institutional factiors and distributive shares (see for example Piketty 2014, Stiglitz
2012), so as to lead many economists to highlight the evidence for ‘new styilized facts’ (Stiglitz 2016
and Jones 2015).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2012 and OECD 2015)
provides a detailed analysis of key factors proposed in literature as the main drivers of falling labor
share during the last decades and special attention has been devoted to the excessive labor-saving
technical change and to the discrepancies between productivity growth and real wages pattern,
especially within the European Monetary Union and the US.
Within the economic literature, different explanations have been proposed in order to account for
the evidence of a declining labor share mainly through neoclassical and classical ‘technology-based ’
or Post-keynesian ‘demand-driven’ lenses. From a Post-keynesian perspective, the increasing role
played by globalization and financialization in advanced economies have been identified as the main
factors accounting for the declining wage share (Lavoie and Stockhammer 2012 and Stockhammer
2013), whereas within the neoclassical stream of literature both theoretical and empirical con-
tributions mainly rely on the hypothesis of different values of ‘elasticity of substitution’ between
production input (labor and capital).
Also from an empirical perspective, many economists within the neoclassical stream of literature
try to account for the role of technical change and its direction in affecting the declining labor
share (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 2003, Bassanini and Manfredi 2014, Hutchinson and Persyn 2012,
Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014). However, all of these contributions have been focused on the
estimation of an elasticity of substitution between production inputs greater than one as the sole
explanation of an increasing ’capital deepening’ affecting in turns the labor share.
During the nineties, Acemoglu proposes a revival of the so-called ‘induced ’ (ITC) and ‘directed ’
1See Stiglitz (2016) for a detailed discussion about the definition of capital-output ratio adopted by Piketty and
its relation with the Kaldor facts.
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technical change hypothesis, stemming from Hicks (1932), by implementing an explicit direction of
technical change, i.e. biased towards skilled or unskilled labor (Acemoglu 1998) or towards labor
or capital input (Acemoglu 2002 and Acemoglu 2003), in order to explain the dynamics of wages
and labor share in the US and European countries. Acemoglu proposes an endogenous growth
model, similar to the monopolistic competition models implemented by Romer (1989), Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Howitt and Aghion (1998), by combining the assumption of elasticity
of substitution less than one with the endogenous bias of technical change towards labor or cap-
ital productivity improvement as the theoretical explanation for labor share fluctuations in the
medium-run, whereas in the long-run the model exhibits constant distributive shares in line with
the ‘Kaldor Facts’.
On similar grounds, in order to account for fluctuations in distributive shares Jones (2005) presents
a growth model implementing a production function with different values of the elasticity of sub-
stitution for short and the long-run that is, respectively, less than and equal to one.
Before Acemoglu, the ITC hypothesis has been developed along neoclassical lines during the sixties
by Kennedy (1964), who proposes a growth model with the so-called ‘Invention Possibility Frontier’
(IPF) in order to represent the trade-off between improvements in labor or capital productivity,
and then by Samuelson (1965) and Drandakis and Phelps (1966).
Moreover, from quite distant theoretical perspectives, the puzzling question about the interplay be-
tween technical change, growth and functional distribution have been also addressed along purely
classical (Van Der Ploeg 1987, Foley and Michl 1999, Foley 2003b, Foley 2003a and Zamparelli
2015) or classical/evolutionary (Dumenil and Levy 2003) lines by implementing the ITC approach.
On this ground, the literature about the so-called ‘Marx-Biased Technical Change’ (MBTC) imple-
ments the ITC hypothesis in order to analyzes the labor-saving/capital using pattern of technical
change observed in many advanced economies during the last decades.
Notwithstanding, if we accept the idea of directed input-saving technical change process induced
by different paces of growth for wages and labor productivity (so-called ‘Habbakkuk Hypothesis’
2) as one of the main explanation for declining labor share in advanced economies, an interesting
puzzling question remains why the moderate growth of wages in the early eighties could have not
revert the labor-saving trend of technical change pattern. Blanchard (1997), for example, explained
this phenomenon with weaker bargaining power of workers and with lagged factor substitution pro-
cess triggered by the ’wage push shock’ after the seventies, for example within many European
countries.
Recently, Stiglitz (2015) and Stiglitz and Greenwald (2015) also propose a model with directed
technical change by using the Kennedy’s IPF in order to show the impact of different values of the
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital input upon long-run growth, distributive shares
and unemployment. Stiglitz highlights how, in a fixed coefficient scenario (the one analyzed within
the present model), excessive labor-saving technical change may have relevant negative effects upon
2In the early sixties, some contributions in the field of economic history (Salter 1962 and Habakkuk 1962) suggest
the relevance of ’labor scarcity’ as a key element accounting for the induced labor-saving technical change, especially
in Great Britain and United States in the nineteenth century.
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functional income distribution and may also reflect in excessively high levels of unemployment.
The contributions illustrated so far, are built upon a ‘supply-side’ and purely technological-based
approach to growth and distribution. Nevertheless, a ‘demand-side’ Keynesian approach has been
increasingly developed by many scholars, in order to account for the effects of aggregate demand
on the dynamics of real and financial side of a monetary production economy. On this ground, a
relatively new and promising literature implementing macroeconomic models with strong interde-
pendence between demand- and supply-side and real and financial side of the economy comes from
the Complex Adaptive System approach applied to economics, stemming from Arthur et al. (1997),
Kirman (2010), and Delli Gatti et al. (2007). Thus, the so-called ‘Keynes + Schumpeter ’ (K+S)
class of models (Dosi et al. 2010, Napoletano et al. 2012, Dosi et al. 2017), the Eurace@Unibi
AB-SFC models (Dawid et al. 2012) and the Agent-Based Stock-Flow Consistent (AB-SFC) mod-
els (Caiani et al. 2016 (Caiani et al. 2018, Caiani et al. 2017a, Caiani et al. 2017b), concentrate
the analysis upon the interplay among the evolutionary endogenous growth process3, income and
wealth distribution, aggregate demand and credit and financial issues.
Following this stream of literature I try to exploit some insight provided by the classical inter-
pretation of the ITC hypothesis by introducing it into a Keynesian demand-side and evolutionary
endogenous growth model in order to suggest a possible explanation for some evidence about growth
and distribution, such as persistent fluctuations of labor share. The main goal is the analysis of
the interplay among technical change, long-run economic growth and functional income distribu-
tion without recurring to any distinction between short-run (Keynesian) and long-run (classical)
framework4.
I propose a single-economy version of the multi-county AB-SFC model implemented by Caiani et al.
(2017a) by adding to this model a capital-good sector, following Caiani et al. (2016) and Caiani
et al. (2018), and dividing the households sector into workers and capitalist agents.
The AB-SFC approach stems from the ‘benchmark’ model implemented by Caiani et al. (2016) and
aims to integrate the Agent-Based tradition developed upon the decentralized matching protocols
for interactions among heterogeneous agents (Riccetti et al. 2015) with the Stock-Flow Consistent
macro modeling approach stemming by Godley and Lavoie (2006), thus allowing us to explicitly
taking into account real- and financial-side stock and flow variables and the supply- and demand-
side of our artificial economy.
As in Caiani et al. (2017a) and in Caiani et al. (2018), I model the evolutionary technical change
process following the two steps procedure implemented by the ‘K+S’ models (Dosi et al. 2010),
although this process takes place within the consumption-good sector (i.e. with ‘disembodied’
technical change). Furthermore, I introduce within this framework a classical-fashioned directed
technical change as heterogeneous consumption-good firms choose both the intensity and the direc-
3See also Dawid (2006) for a detailed discussion on Agent-Based Modeling approach applied to economics of
innovation and technical change.
4For example, a ‘traverse’ model has been proposed by Dumenil and Levy (1999), where two different investment
behaviors are implemented depending on the time horizon: a Keynesian investment function in the short-run and a
classical investment function in the long-run. Dosi et al. (2015) also propose an interesting analysis of classical and
Keynesian accumulation regimes as different roots of business fluctuations.
3
tion of the innovation towards a labor- or capital-saving choice of technique, and as they decide to
adopt the new production technique depending on a classical profitability criterion (Okishio 1961,
Shaikh 1978, Nakatani 1979, Shaikh 1999, Park 2001 and Shaikh 2016).
This modeling framework allows us to enrich the analysis of ’non-neutral ’ technical change and its
effects upon key macroeconomic variables. Indeed, many traditional directed innovation models
adopt the IPF a´-la-Kennedy in order to analyze the trade-off between labor or capital produc-
tivity improvements, whereas the Agent-Based approach allows us to let the ‘innovation bias’
be an ‘emergent property ’ of the evolutionary technical change process engaged by consumption-
good firms. Thus by introducing the classical-fashioned directed innovation mechanism and the
profitability criterion for the choice of new techniques within the well-established tradition of evo-
lutionary demand-driven endogenous growth we are bridging two different theoretical traditions:
the directed technical change process implemented in many supply-side growth models and the
localized evolutionary innovation mechanism implemented within many recent (post-) Keynesian
endogenous growth models5. Moreover, the AB approach also allows us to present a richer dynam-
ics for the pattern of long-run growth, productivity and functional distribution in the light of both
‘Kaldor facts’ and ‘new’ evidences. On similar grounds, Delli Gatti et al. (2006) also propose a
‘supply side’ Agent-Based model wherein the interplay among R&D investment, labor-saving tech-
nical change, capital accumulation, wage-profit dynamics and financial factors have been analyzed
in order to reproduce Kaldor facts and Goodwin-like growth cycles. In line with their long-run
findings the present model, enriched by explicitly modeling the demand-side of the economy, is able
to reproduce the ‘Kaldor facts’ (i.e. with purely labor-saving technical change). However, during
the transitional phase the model presents a labor-saving/capital-using innovation pattern, as the
aggregate output-capital ratio decreases until it stabilizes in the long-run, as well as declining labor
share for long time periods. We can ascribe these findings to the directed and biased technical
change process and in order to stress the effective role of the innovation bias, the baseline scenario
has been compared with a ‘counterfactual ’ scenario wherein a ‘neutral ’ technical progress is at work.
2. The Model
The model is populated by K firms producing a homogeneous capital good, only using labor
input, and C consumption firms producing a homogeneous final good over two inputs (labor and
capital). Consumption-good firms also innovate their production process in order to save the
(relatively) expensive production input and try to obtain some profitability gain (Dumenil and
Levy 2003, Foley and Michl 1999, Foley 2003b, Zamparelli 2015, Stiglitz 2015).
Household sector is composed by two classes of agents: workers and capitalists. Workers sell their
5Acemoglu (2014) recently highlights some connection between the localized technical change framework, stemming
by the Atkinson and Stiglitz ’new view’ (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969), the ITC hypothesis and the directed and biased
innovation framework. Dosi and Virgillito (2016) also propose a discussion about the Atkinson and Stiglitz approach
by analyzing it through ’Schumpeterian’ lenses, thus from a theoretical perspective much closer to the one embraced
in the present contribution.
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labor force to the capital and consumption firms and capitalists represent the equity investors (i.e.
the firms and banks’ equity owners) receiving their income in the form of dividends. All the agents
within the household sector consume their income on the final good market and they save the
residual amount (in the form of bank deposits or equity investment as capitalists agents).
Commercial banks offer deposit accounts to households and firms and endogenously create private
money by providing loans to the consumption firms.
Our artificial economy also has a government and a central bank (see subsections 2.7 and 2.6).
As in Caiani et al. (2017b) we have an endogenous entry/exit process. Thus, the simulation model
starts with no firms and banks and they are progressively created during the simulation by means
of investment out of capitalists’ savings.
As in the SIM model, the simplest SFC model implemented by Godley and Lavoie (2006), everything
starts with government public expenditure, in the form of lump-sum transfers distributed across
workers and capitalists. This transfers are initially saved by households, and then begun to be
invested by capitalist agents for the creation of new firms (primarily) and eventually new banks.
After that the production starts and then possibly also the demand for loans by consumption firms
to commercial banks.
Each period the heterogeneous agents directly interact on each market by means of decentralized
matching protocols (Riccetti et al. 2015 and Caiani et al. 2016). The demand-side agents observe
a random subset of suppliers, whose size is given by a fixed parameter measuring the degree of
imperfect information.
2.1. The Simulation Schedule
1. Capital-good firms decide the wage to be offered and the selling price for their production;
2. Consumption firms determine the production planning by deciding the desired quantity of
output, the desired quantity of labor input, wages, selling prices, the desired amount of
resources to be invested in R&D and, eventually, the demand for loans;
3. Commercial banks and consumption-firms interact on the credit market;
4. Final-good firms decide the accumulation plan by computing the desired growth rate of pro-
duction capacity (and hence the desired quantity of capital goods);
5. Capital and consumption firms interact with workers on the labor market;
6. Capital firms interact with consumption firms in the capital goods market;
7. Workers receive their wages and are employed for production and R&D activities. Capitalist
agents receive dividends generated in the previous period;
8. Consumption-good firms undertake the innovation process and compare the new random
technique with the one inherited from the previous period. Then they produce the final good;
9. Government decides the tax-rate and the public expenditure planning;
10. Bonds market interactions;
11. Households pay taxes on their income and receive the tax-exempt transfers by the Govern-
ment. Then, they compute the desired consumption and interact with the final-good firms;
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12. Firms compute their profits and net worth and the taxes to be paid in the next period.
Consumption firms also compute the dividends to be distributed in the next period to the
equity investors (capitalists);
13. Entry/exit process. Capitalists invest and eventually create new firms and banks.
2.2. Capital-good Firms
We have k = 1, . . . ,K firms (capital sector) producing each period a certain quantity of inter-
mediate capital goods, yKk,t, depending on the demand requested by the consumption-good firms as




with aK indicating the (constant) labor productivity for workers employed in the capital pro-
duction process and NDk,t indicating the desired quantity of labor needed in order to produce the
capital output.





and decide the quantity of capital output to be produced, yKk,t, depending on the desired quantity




Capital firms adopt an adaptive wage rule depending on the wage offered in the previous period
and on the difference between labor demanded and labor actually employed in the previous period
(Caiani et al. 2017a), as follows:
wk,t =
wk,t−1(1− U [0, δ]), if NDk,t−1 −Nk,t−1 = 0 with Pr(ut) = 1− eutvwk,t−1(1 + U [0, δ]), if NDk,t−1 −Nk,t−1 > 0 (4)
If firms were not satisfied, that is labor demanded is greater than the employed one in t − 1,
they have a positive probability Pr(ut) of downward revising the offered wage. This probability is
inversely related to the level of unemployment in the economy ut, with a positive (fixed) parameter
v indicating the strength of their relation (the lower v the higher the probability of reducing the
wages).
Then, the capital firms adopt this simple pricing rule





with a fixed mark-up over the unit labor costs.
2.3. Consumption-good Firms
2.3.1. Production, Prices and Wages
We have c = 1, . . . , C heterogeneous firms producing a homogeneous consumption good over
two inputs (labor and capital) assuming a fixed coefficient Leontief production function, as follows
yc,t = min{uc,tϕkc,tyKc,t;ϕlc,tNc,t} (6)
with uc,t indicating the degree of capacity utilization, ϕkc,t and ϕlc,t being, respectively, the
capital and labor productivity, whereas yKc,t and Nc,t are the capital and labor input. Consumption-
good firms may improve the inputs’ productivity (ϕkc,t and ϕlc,t) by means of the R&D activity,
and they adopt a new production technique depending on a profitability criterion, that is if the
expected profit rate related to new innovation is greater than the actual one (see subsection 2.3.2).
Once the firm has chosen the production technique, it can compute the desired output and the
desired quantity of labor (for simplicity, hereafter we refer again to t and t − 1 as the actual and















Each period, consumption firms adaptively revise prices and their expectations about selling,
as follows:
if yc,t ≥ yec,t−1 :
yec,t = yec,t−1(1 + U [0, δ])pc,t = pc,t−1(1 + U [0, δ]) (9)
if yc,t ≤ yec,t−1and ytotc,t−1 > yc,t−1 :
yec,t = yec,t−1(1− U [0, δ])pc,t = pc,t−1(1− U [0, δ]) (10)
if yc,t ≤ yec,t−1and ytotc,t−1 = yc,t−1 :
yec,t = yec,t−1pc,t = pc,t−1 (11)
where yc,t−1 indicates the output sold in the previous period and ytotc,t = yc,t−1 + invc,t. The
desired output can be computed as yDc,t = y
ec, t(1 + θ)− invc,t6.
6The desired quantities (here of labor and output) could be lower then the effective ones, so we could have that
NDc,t ≥ Nc,t and yDc,t ≥ yc,t.
The desired quantity of (fixed) capital stock is computed depending on the accumulation decision (see subsection
7




Finally, also consumption firms adopt an adaptive wage rule, as follows:
wc,t =
wc,t−1(1− U [0, δ]), if NDc,t−1 −Nc,t−1 = 0 with Pr(ut) = 1− eutvwc,t−1(1 + U [0, δ]), if NDc,t−1 −Nc,t−1 > 0 (12)
2.3.2. Innovation
Each period firms C undertake an evolutionary innovation process and they decide to adopt the
new random technology only by comparing its expected profit rate with the actual one (Okishio
1961, Shaikh 1978, Nakatani 1979, Shaikh 1999, Park 2001 Shaikh 2016).
The innovation process starts after the decision about the desired investment in the R&D activity,




Then, the innovation process takes place in two steps as in the ‘K+S’ tradition Dosi et al.
2010). In a first step, firms compute a Bernoulli experiment in order to determine whether the
R&D activity has been successful, so we have:
PrINt = 1− e−νINc,t (14)
and this probability is affected by the amount of resources invested in innovation.
Then, we have a second step were the new production technique is obtained with two random draws
for the growth rate of capital and labor productivity, as follows:
ϕ+kc,t+1 = ϕkc,t(1 + ϕˆk) (15)
and
ϕ+lc,t+1 = ϕlc,t(1 + ϕˆl) (16)
with ϕˆk ∼ U [−δ, δ] and ϕˆl ∼ U [−δ, δ].
Thus, we have a symmetric support for the random draws of labor and capital productivity im-
provements. This allows us to let the innovation bias emerge without imposing any analytical
trade-off between a labor or capital productivity improvement, i.e. without imposing an ‘Invention
Possibility Frontier’ a´-la-Kennedy.
As stated above, the adoption of the new technique depends on a profitability criterion, i.e. it is
adopted only if
r+c,t+1 > rc,t. (17)
2.3.3).
7With µ indicating a (fixed) mark-up over the unit labor costs.
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with pc,tyc,t indicating the revenues obtained by selling production in the previous period,
wc,tNc,t and pkc,ty
K
c,t indicating, respectively, the costs of the production factors and i
l
c,tLc,t being
the repayment for loans obtained before production process (see subsection 2.3.4).
After some substitution we obtain the profit rate inherited from t and the potential profit rate
expected from the adoption of the new random technique (ϕ+kc, ϕ
+
lc) in t+ 1, as follows
rc,t =




























= ω+c,t+1 indicating, respectively, the wage share of c without and with
the adoption of the new production technique. Thus, firms compare (eq. 17) the ‘old’ and the
‘transient’ profit rate within a ‘real competition’ framework (Shaikh 1999, Park 2001 and Shaikh
2016).
Consumption-good firms presenting productivity gaps with respect to the sectoral average may
try to catch-up by imitating the leading competitors, as follows:
ϕxc,t+1 = ϕxc,t + U [0,Φt − ϕxc,t] if ϕxc,t < Φt (21)
with x = {l, k}.
2.3.3. Investment and Capital Accumulation
Consumption firms compute each period their desired rate of growth of productive capacity
depending on their profitability and their capacity utilization compared to their ’normal’ rates (as








with δ1 and δ2 representing, respectively, the investments’ sensitivity to the profit rate and to the
capacity utilization, and uDc,t is the desired capacity utilization
9, and r and u indicating, respec-
8As in Caiani et al. (2016) and Caiani et al. (2018), we refer to Π∗c,t as the Operating Cash Flow, that is the firm’s
profit excluding the variation of the inventories (see subsection 2.3.4).







tively, the ‘normal’ profit rate and capacity utilization rate10. Thus we have both a ‘classical’
and a ‘Kaleckian’ engine for the investment decision undertaken by consumption firms depending,
respectively, on the weight given to the profit rate and on the weight given to the desired degree of
capacity utilization.
After the accumulation decision, c computes the desired nominal investment, iDc,t, as the number
of capital units needed due to the obsolescence of capital (given a fixed depreciation rate δ and a
given life span for machineries) and/or fill the possible gap between the current and the desired
capacity. Then, the desired real investment will be IDc,t = i
D
c,tpkc,t.
2.3.4. Financing Demand, Profits and Net Worth
Each final-good firm may finance its production activity by means of internal funds, that is
its net worth Ac,t, and/or, if necessary, by means of external funds, that is a desired quantity of
loans11, LDc,t, with an interest rate i
l
c,t (see subsection 2.5).
The demand for loans requested to the banking sector depends on the cost of the desired quantity
of productive inputs and on the disposable internal funds, as follows
LDc,t =
wc,tNDc,t + pkc,tyKDc,t −Ac,t, if wc,tNDc,t + pkc,tyKDc,t > Ac,t0, otherwise. (23)
The desired quantity of loans could differ from the effective amount obtained, that is we could
have LDc,t ≥ Lc,d, due to an unsatisfactory amount of loans to be supplied by the banks or due to
an individual credit rationing (as production activity has the priority on the R&D expenditure).
Firms’ profits are given by the difference between revenues and expenditure:
Πc,t = pc,tyc,t + ∆INVc,t − wc,tNc,t − pkc,tyKc,t − INc,t − ilc,tLc,t. (24)
and firms’ net worth evolves according to the following law of motion:
NWc,t = NWc,t−1 + Π∗c,t−1 − T pic,t −DIVc,t. (25)
When the operating cash flows are positive (Π∗c,t−1 > 0), firms pay taxes on their profits (T pic,t)
and distribute dividends (DIVc,t) to equity owners (capitalists), as follows
T pic,t =
τtΠ∗c,t, if Π∗c,t > 00, otherwise. (26)
and
10Assumed to be constant and equal across firms. Caiani et al. (2018) and Caiani et al. (2017b) calibrate the values
for these ‘normal’ rates by computing the steady-state solution of the aggregate model preceding the simulation.
11For simplicity, we assume that each loans lasts only one period.
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DIVc,t =
ρ(Π∗c,t − T pic,t), if Π∗c,t > 00, otherwise. (27)
with τt indicating the tax-rate decided by the government (see subsection 2.7).
2.4. Households
We have h = 1, . . . ,H households (workers and capitalists) consuming their income on the con-
sumption goods market, saving in the form of bank deposits and paying taxes over their income.
Only workers sell their labor force to consumption- and capital-good firms, whereas capitalists only
own firms and banks receiving dividends as a share of their profits.
2.4.1. Workers
Workers update each period their reservation wage depending on their occupational status, as
follows
ww,t =
ww,t−1(1 + U [0, δ]), if employed in t− 1 with Pr(ut)ww,t−1(1− U [0, δ]), if unemployed in t− 1 (28)
with Pr(ut) indicating a positive probability of increasing the wage claims (as for consumption
firms).
Workers gross income is given by
yw,t = ww,t + i
d
b,tDw,t (29)
with idb,tDw,t indicating the interest rate gained from bank deposits
12 and TFt representing the
tax-exempt transfer received by government13.
2.4.2. Capitalists
Capitalists gross income is given by
ym,t = DIVm,t + i
d
b,tDm,t (30)
with DIVm,t indicating the dividends received by the firms/banks they own and i
d
b,tDm,t being
the interests on their deposits.
Capitalists may save their wealth (NWm,t) either as deposit accounts Dm,t or as investment in
12For simplicity we assume the same interest rate offered by the banking sector.
13These transfers represent the public expenditure in this model, as in Caiani et al. (2017a), see subsection 2.7.
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firms/banks’ equity Am,t. The choice between these two assets depends on a certain degree of
liquidity preference (LPm,t)
14.
Thus, capitalists compute the desired level of wealth depending on their disposable income and
the desired consumption, as follows
NWDm,t = NWm,t−1 + y
DISP
m,t − CDm,t (31)
then they obtain the desired level of deposits and equity as
DDm,t = NW
D
m,t − (ADm,t −Am,t−1) (32)
and
ADm,t = max{Am,t−1, (1− LPm,t)NWDm,t} (33)
with ADm,t − Am,t−1 indicating the desired investment in equity, which is bounded to be non-
negative (Caiani et al. 2017a).
As for the other desired variables in the model, we could also have that CDh,t > Ch,t (with h = m,w),
and in the case of capitalist agents this means that NWDm,t < NWm,t. In this case deposits act as
a buffer stock variable with Am,t remaining at the planned level.
The disposable income for a generic agent within the household sector (worker or capitalist) is
given by
yDISPh,t = (1− τt)yh,t (34)
with h = w,m and τt indicating the tax-rate in the current period.
Each period, households also decide the desired quantity of consumption depending on their current
disposable income and their wealth (i.e. bank deposits), as follows
CDh,t = α1hy
DISP
h,t + α2hDh,t (35)
with 0 < α1h < 1 and 0 < α2h < 1 and αw > αm.
Thus, the desired savings are
SDh,t = y
DISP
h,t − CDh,t (36)
14See Caiani et al. (2017a), for a detailed description of how capitalists compute their liquidity preference. In the
original model, the household sector is not composed by both workers and capitalists so households as a whole act




We leave the banking sector functioning as well as the Government and the Central Bank
behavior exactly as in Caiani et al. (2018). Thus, we have b = 1, . . . , B banks collecting deposits
from households and firms (i.e. capitalists’ deposits), offering an interest rate idb,t (which is a
constant fraction of the discount rate it fixed by the central bank), they endogenously create means
of payment by providing credit to consumption-good firms and they may purchase government
bonds.










with it indicating the discount rate fixed by central bank.
The desired supply of loans depends on banks’ net worth
LSDb,t = µ1Ab,t (39)
and the maximum amount that a bank may provide to each firm is a maximum share of its
supply (ζLSDb,t ).
Commercial banks have a minimum amount of reserves to be held by the Central Bank as a
proportion of their deposits
Rminb,t = µ2Db,t (40)
receiving a fixed interest rate ires.
Then, banks may also spend the remaining amount of liquidity by purchasing government bonds










tBb,t + iresRb,t −BDc,b,t − idtDb,t − itLcbb,t (41)
with BDc,b,t indicating the ‘bad debt’, that is the non performing loans due to firms’ defaults.
Also banks’ profits are subject to taxation, and then net profit are eventually distributed to the
equity owners as for firms (see equations 26 and 27).
15As in Caiani et al. (2017a) banks randomly access the bond market with a probability of purchase them, depending





We have a central bank that offering cash advances (CAt) requested by commercial banks,
holding their reserves (RCB,t), and eventually purchasing the residual amount of government bonds
(BCB,t).
Central bank also computes its profits and we assume that they are automatically distributed to
government, so we have
ΠCB,t = i
b
tBCB,t + itCAt − iresRCB, t (42)
2.7. Government












Government public expenditure Gt is represented by tax-exempt transfers to households (TFt).
In each period, government may has a budget surplus SURt or deficit DEFt, so we have
DEFt = Gt + i
b
t−1Bt−1 − Tt (44)
with public debt defined as
Bt = Bt−1 −DEFt − SURt−1. (45)
Finally, the interest rate on public bonds depends on the debt-on-GDP ratio and on the central






The model has been ran for 1000 periods (each period corresponds to a quarter, thus we have
a time-span of 250 years) and for 50 Monte Carlo simulations following a baseline calibration (see
Table 5). Following Dosi et al. (2010) and Caiani et al. (2016) I check for the validity of the model
by means of a minimum empirical validation. The model is indeed able to reproduce a collection
of macroeconomic stylized facts as his ancestors (Caiani et al. 2016, Caiani et al. 2018 and Caiani
et al. 2017a).
Figure 1 shows the cross-correlation functions related to cyclical component of some key macroe-
conomic variable. The position of the peak in each figure, that is to the left, centered or to the
right, indicates whether the variable is, respectively, lagged, coincident or leading with respect
14
to the other one. Cross-correlation functions of real consumption, public expenditure and wages
with real GDP show that these variable are coincident and strongly pro-cyclical, whereas real in-
vestment, unemployment and public expenditure-GDP ratio are coincident and counter-cyclical.
The cross-correlation of private saving with firms’ wage share provides evidences for lower workers’
propensity to consume. Moreover, cross-correlation between labor productivity and, respectively,
real output and wages show that both a Kaldorian/Smithian and a Ricardian16 mechanism boosts
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Figure 1. Average cross-correlations (across 50 Monte Carlo) of labor productivity, consumption,
investment, unemployment, public expenditure, public expenditure-GDP ratio and wage with real
GDP, average cross-correlations of labor productivity with wage, and of wage share with private
saving.
Figure 2 represents the model dynamics showing the artificial time series related to some key
variable during a single simulation run. As we can see the model shows self-sustained endogenous
growth process, with exponential growth of real-GDP, real consumption and labor productivity
(Y/L), which follows the pattern of real-GDP (so-called ‘Kaldor effect ’ or ‘Smith effect ’). Indeed,
16For a detailed discussion about the so-called ‘Smith’ and ‘Ricardo effect ’ in shaping technical progress dynamics
in capitalist economies see Sylos-Labini (1983).
15
the analysis of the interplay among technical change and capital accumulation processes together
with the pattern of wages and labor productivity is pivotal to understand the dynamics of our model
at both micro and macroeconomic level. The model endogenously reproduces persistent fluctua-
tions of aggregate wage share (i.e. total labor costs over total output or aggregate real wage-labor
productivity ratio) due to different paces of the growth of wages and labor productivity (fig. 2).
Thus, by definition we have that when real wages grow slower (faster) than labor productivity the
wage share decreases (increases). However these fluctuations are driven by the predominance of
two different economic forces during the technical change process.
On the one hand, firms are encouraged to improve their inputs’ productivity by means of R&D
investment, and thus by hiring workers for innovation and production activities, in order to increase
their selling and conquer greater market shares. Therefore higher levels of R&D investments result
in higher probability of innovating (eq. 15) so that more productive firms can also reduce their
selling prices and improve their competitiveness as long as they achieve higher levels of produc-
tivity and greater market performances compared to their competitors. From a macroeconomic
point of view these phases of ‘virtuous circles’ triggered by innovation and production processes
driven in turn by greater sales expectations (that is by real consumption and aggregate demand)
also improve aggregate employment dynamics creating positive feedback mechanisms for the overall
economy. Of course some firms may suffer from productivity gaps and may have difficulties to sell
production output and thus to increase their profit margins, however they may also try to catch up
with leading firms by imitating their production technique (eq. 22). All in all, the ‘Schumpeterian’
evolutionary dynamics may lead more productive firms to survive whereas less productive ones may
go bankrupt due to less willingness to grant credit by commercial banks (see in fig. 4 the dynamics
of credit and firms survival) and due to difficulties to sell their product with an excessive stockpiling
process.
Nevertheless, on the other hand firms also increasingly accumulate capital stock due to technologi-
cal progress progressively improving labor productivity (to a greater extent than the improvement
of capital productivity as shown in fig. 3), so that a greater amount of output can be produced by
using less workers, as shown in fig. 2 with exponential growth of aggregate output-labor ratio as
well as increasing ‘capital-deepening ’ 17 (fig. 5).
The predominance of these two opposite forces, that is virtuous innovative cycles and excessive
labor-saving innovation pattern, also affects wage dynamics. Indeed more productive firms achiev-
ing greater market shares with higher levels of profitability and larger size in terms of internal
financing and net worth are able to hire more workers for R&D and production activities, however
on the other hand an excessive labor-saving pattern of technical change may lead to higher levels of
unemployment thus weakening the bargaining power of workers as their wage claims are negatively
affected by higher levels of unemployment (eq. 28). This negative feedback mechanism may be
further exacerbated when capital-good firms fail to absorb the workers fired by consumption-firms.
17In this respect, we also compare our findings with the results provided by the ABM implemented by Delli Gatti
et al. (2006).
16
Indeed, the increasing accumulation process of capital stock engaged by consumption-firms gen-
erate growing capital demand that cannot be continuously fulfilled given our assumption of fixed
labor productivity for capital firms (i.e. we have capital shortage), thus capital-good firms try to
hire an increasing amount of workers trying to satisfy the requested demand of capital goods18.
















































Figure 2. Artificial time series of Real GDP, (real) consumption, average labor productivity, average
real wages, wage share for consumption-good firms and rate of unemployment for a single simulation
run from time period 500 to 1000.
Moreover, as stated above firms do not innovate to the same extent in order to gain labor-
or capital-productivity improvements, i.e. we have a ‘directed ’ and ‘biased ’ technical progress.
Indeed, the pattern of the difference between average labor and capital productivity (ϕlt − ϕkt)
shows (fig. 3) how the ‘innovation bias‘ endogenously emerges from the choice of techniques made
by consumption firms, depending in turn on a classical profitability criterion (equation ??), by
means of different random draws from a symmetric support (equations 15 and 16) without imposing
any ’Innovation Possibility Frontier ’ a´-la-Kennedy.
As pointed out by Stiglitz (2015) and Stiglitz and Greenwald (2015), a ‘learning-to-learn’ process
is at work, that is the factor-biased technical change process may feed upon itself as firms become
more skilled at learning how to save the labor input.
In order to corroborate the hypothesis about the emergence of the innovation bias from the
18See Vivarelli (2015) Calvino and Virgillito (2018) for a detailed survey about different ‘compensation’ mechanisms
proposed in literature in order to explain the interplay between innovation and employment.
17
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Percentage difference between average labor productivity and capital productivity, i.e.
the difference between the inputs’ productivity chosen from the random draws depending on the
profitability criterion. Continuous and dashed lines indicate, respectively, average trend and trend
standard deviation across 50 Monte Carlo simulations (from time period 100 to 1000).
stochastic evolutionary technical change process, I investigate what happens in a ‘counterfactual’
scenario with neutral technical change (i.e. Hicks-neutral), that is with the same random draw for
the growth rate of labor and capital productivity (ϕˆl = ϕˆk). Figure 4 shows the average trend
components across 50 Monte Carlo runs for the artificial time series related to the baseline and the
‘counterfactual’ scenario. The artificial time series have been detrended by means of the Hodrick-
Prescott filter and continuous and dashed lines indicate, respectively, average trends and trends
standard deviations across the Monte Carlo runs. As we can see, in the ‘innovation bias scenario’
the direction of the choice of techniques towards an ‘excessive’ labor-saving technical change over-
all negatively affects the macroeconomic environment in our economy by weakening real-GDP and
real consumption growth as a persistent slowdown of wages with respect to labor productivity
(i.e. exacerbating faster growth of labor productivity with respect to wage growth) also reflects in
contractions of the purchase power for workers, that is the class of households’ agents with higher
propensity to consume, leading to contractions of aggregate demand. Within the neutral innova-
tion scenario firms almost indiscriminately choose improvement of both production input (labor
and capital) without directing the innovation effort towards the input exerting higher pressure upon
firms’ cost structure (i.e. labor input). Hence, the neutral innovation hypothesis should not allows
us to analyze the endogenous emergence of fluctuations in the labor share together with relatively
higher levels of unemployment. Thus, the ‘innovation bias’ scenario allows us to provide a possible
explanation for the endogenous emergence of persistent negative pattern of distributive shares as
a consequence of ‘non-neutral’ technical progress.
As stated above, in the long-run the model is also able to reproduce the so-called ‘Kaldor Styl-
ized Facts’, thus, we have (fig. 5) increasing growth of output-labor ratio (i.e. the aggregated
labor productivity), real wages (fig. 2) and growing capital-labor ratio (i.e. the ‘capital deepen-
ing ’) (fig. 5). According to the Kaldor facts, we also have roughly constant: distributive shares,
average profit rate and output-capital ratio (i.e. the aggregated capital productivity) as shown in
18
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Figure 4. Average trends (continuous lines) and trends standard deviations (dashed lines) across
25 Monte Carlo simulations from time period 100 to 1000. I analyze two different scenarios: the
’baseline’ scenario (black line) and a ‘counterfactual’ scenario wherein I implement a ‘neutral’
technical change process (red line).
19
fig. 5. However, these are solely long-run phenomena. During the overall simulation, these vari-
ables show a richer dynamics. The average firms’ profit rate shows decreasing pattern for long
time periods until it stabilizes around its ‘normal’ value. Indeed the rate of profit it is a crucial
variable either for firms’ choice of technique and for their investment planning. Indeed, according
to eq. 17 consumption firms discriminate among different productivity improvements depending
on the expected profitability associated to new random techniques by trying to gain higher prof-
itability due to an input-saving innovation process. However, many economic factors may lead to
a ‘fallacy of coordination’ underling the aggregate pattern of the profit rate due to the relevant
feedback mechanisms among technical change, wages, capital accumulation and the profit rate. For
example, firms are profit-oriented and increasingly try to improve labor productivity by means of
R&D activities in order to reduce the quantity of workers needed to expand their production and
to improve the profit margins. However, as discussed above, an excessive labor-saving trajectory
of technical change may be detrimental for the dynamics of wage as both firms and workers have
a certain probability of reducing the offered and requested wage depending on the unemployment
level in our economy (eq.12 and eq. 28). On the one hand the weaker dynamics of wages increases
firms’ profit margins though a reduction in the labor cost, but on the other hand it reduces the
purchase power of the class with higher propensity to consume (that is, workers) thus weakening
the aggregate demand. A contraction of the aggregate consumption may lead a greater number
of consumption-good firms to suffer from weaker selling performances and lower revenues thus re-
ducing in turns internal financing capacity and inducing higher loans demand to commercial banks
(whose willingness to accord loan requests depends in turns on firms leverage and thus on firms’
net worth). Moreover the ongoing capital accumulation process boosts the growth of firms capital
stocks so to further deteriorate profit margins and thus the rate of profit. Then, we also observe
decreasing output-capital ratio for the overall simulation until it stabilizes in the long-run, provid-
ing support for purely labor-augmenting technical change (i.e. Harrod-neutral) in the long-run but
for labor-saving/capital-using technical change in the short- and medium-run. This trend is driven
either by the accumulation of capital stock and by the faster growth of capital prices with respect
to the inflation of consumption-good prices. Indeed, consumption firms may reduce their selling
prices due to increasing productivity gains whereas in our model capital firms cannot undertake
innovation activity in order to improve their production process and they are more constrained
in reducing the price of capital goods for competitiveness purposes. Finally, as discussed above
we observe fluctuations of the labor share, and particularly a falling trend for long time periods
due to the innovation bias towards an excessive labor-saving technical change (fig. 4). Thus we
can conclude that the magnitude of firms’ capital accumulation process together with the direction
of biased technical change if not offset by means of strong ’wage-push’ forces (see section 4) may
lead to worse macroeconomic performances compared to the outcome obtained within the neutral
innovation scenario.
We ought to highlight that in this model we focus our analysis on the effect of a ‘non-neutral’
technical change process upon long-run growth and functional income distribution, and that we
20




































Average Firm Profit Rate
Figure 5. Artificial time series of output-labor ratio (Y/L), capital-labor ratio (K/L), average profit
rate and output-capital ratio (Y/K) for a single simulation run from time period 500 to 1000.
are analyzing only process innovation. Thus, a more sophisticated model wherein we also consider
product innovation and a segmented labor market, depending on different skills and/or different
income-classes, would allows us to deeper analyze the interplay among technical change, growth,
distributive shares and employment as we can consider, for example, the effects of different wage
regimes upon different classes of workers. This is the case in Caiani et al. (2018) and Caiani
et al. (2017b) wherein the effects of an excessive labor-saving technical change are not considered
detrimental for growth and employment (or, rectius, wherein these effects are offset by a greater
propensity to consume of lower-income workers) and where the higher levels of unemployment are
explained as a consequence of growing income and wealth inequalities. However, a quite general
dynamics has been presented for our artificial economy triggered by an excessive labor-saving
technical change process which reproduces realistic patterns highlighted in theoretical and empirical
contributions.
4. Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis has been performed on the fiscal target for government’s adaptive deci-
sions about public expenditure and taxation (fig. 6), and on the initial wage offered by new created
consumption firms during the simulation (fig. 7).
As in Caiani et al. (2017a), I implement a fiscal policy experiment, in order to assess whether restric-
tive (i.e. ‘austerity’ policies) or expansionary fiscal policies, have some effect on long-run growth,
productivity, distributive shares and unemployment, besides affecting the overall macroeconomic
21
performance of our economy19. The fiscal policy experiment has been performed for different values
of the maximum deficit/GDP ratio (dmax) representing the target for the adaptive decisions about
public expenditure planning and tax rate revision by the government. This target is initially set
to dmax = 0.03 (i.e. ‘Maastricht constraint’ ) in the ‘baseline ’ and then we change its value at
period t = 500. The government follows an adaptive behavior rule in order to adjust the public
expenditure and the tax rate20, as follows:
if dt ≥ dmaxand GDt ≤ Gt−1 :
Gt = Gt−1(1− U [0, δ]τt+1 = τt(1 + U [0, δ]) (47)
if dt ≥ dmaxand GDt > Gt−1 :
Gt = Gt−1τt+1 = τt(1 + U [0, δ]) (48)
if dt < d
maxand GDt ≤ Gt−1 :
Gt = Gt−1(1− U [0, δ]τt+1 = τt(1− U [0, δ]) (49)
if dt < d
maxand GDt > Gt−1 :
Gt = Gt−1(1 + U [0, δ]τt+1 = τt (50)
thus we define the fiscal policy as a revision of public expenditure and tax rate depending on
the maximum fiscal target (dmax).
Figure 6 shows the average trend across 25 Monte Carlo simulations of real-GDP, labor pro-
ductivity, capital and consumption-good prices, wages, real consumption and investment, number
of consumption firms, credit-GDP ratio, R&D expenditure-GDP ratio, labor share and unemploy-
ment rate for different values of the maximum deficit/GDP ratio. The baseline scenario (black
line) corresponds to dmax = 0.03 (i.e. the value imposed by the Maastricht Treaty), the restric-
tive scenarios are investigated with dmax = 0.025 (orange line), with dmax = 0.02 (red line) and
dmax = 0.015 (red line), whereas the expansionary scenarios correspond to dmax = 0.035 (light
blue line) and dmax = 0.04 (blue line). As we can see, a restrictive (expansionary) fiscal policy
exerts negative (positive) long-run effect upon growth and distribution in our artificial economy. In
line with the results provided by Caiani et al. (2017a), we find that an expansionary (restrictive)
fiscal policy positively (negatively) affects the macroeconomic performance of our economy showing
stronger (weaker) growth patterns of real-GDP, labor productivity, consumption and investment,
as well as an improvement of consumption- and capital-good prices and wages dynamics. A virtu-
ous (viscous) dynamics of growth and productivity also reflects on credit dynamics as firms with
greater profit margins can successfully apply for bank loans in order to expand their production
and innovation activities (see the pattern of innovation expenditure over GDP ratio), and on the
19 Dawid et al. (2017) also propose a multi regional AB-SFC about the effects of fiscal transfers in a monetary
union.
20See Caiani et al. (2017a) for a detailed discussion of this adaptive fiscal rule and the effects of different fiscal
target scenarios in a multicountry monetary union model.
22
‘Schumpeterian’ competitive race among firms showing a greater number of firms surviving under
the two expansionary scenarios (the opposite occurs under the restrictive scenarios). Furthermore,
the positive effect exerted by an expansionary fiscal target also reflects in higher labor share and
lower unemployment rate. Thus we can say that the detrimental effects exerted of the innovation
bias upon growth and distribution in our economy can offset by an expansionary Keynesian fiscal
policy.
Furthermore, as stated above, the sensitivity analysis has been also performed on the initial
wage (w0) offered by firms and then revised during the simulation following the adaptive rule
(eq. 12) described in section 2.3.1. As discussed in section 3, within our artificial economy the
magnitude of firms’ capital accumulation process together with the direction of biased technical
change may lead to worse macroeconomic performances compared to the outcome obtained within
the neutral innovation scenario, thus we analyze the effect of an increase in the initial wage offered
by new firms during the endogenous entry/exit process21. As we can see in figure 7, the so-called
‘paradox of costs’(Kalecki 1971) holds in our economy. Thus, an increase in the initial wage offered
by firms gives a positive stimulus to the dynamics of growth and labor productivity through the
positive effect of the aggregate demand, that is due to an increase in the purchase power of workers
reflecting in turns in greater aggregate consumption.
21see Caiani et al. (2017a) for a detailed description.
23
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Figure 6. Average trends (continuous lines) and trends standard deviations (dashed lines) across 25
Monte Carlo simulations. We have the ’baseline’ scenario (black line) with dmax = 0.03 and then
three restrictive (‘austerity’ ) scenario with dmax = {0.025; 0.02; 0.015} (respectively, red, yellow
and light blue line) and two expansionary scenarios with dmax = {0.035; 0.04} (respectively, blue
and pink line). 24
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Figure 7. Average trends (continuous lines) and trends standard deviations (dashed lines) across
25 Monte Carlo simulations.We compare the baseline scenario (black line) with different scenarios
representing the pattern of real output, consumption, aggregate labor productivity and real wages
with progressively higher values of initial wage (w0).
25
5. Conclusions
The main strength of the present contribution concerns the integration of a classical-fashioned
induced and directed innovation process within a Keynesian demand-led and evolutionary endoge-
nous growth model. The AB-SFC macro modeling approach allows us to analyze the innovation bias
as an emergent property of the technical change process engaged by heterogeneous consumption-
good firms choosing both the intensity and the direction of the innovation towards a labor- or
capital-saving choice of technique.
In the long-run the model reproduces the so-called ‘Kaldor Stylized Facts’ (i.e. we have a purely
labor-saving technical change), however during the transitional phases the model shows a labor-
saving/capital using innovation pattern as the aggregate output-capital ratio decreases until it
stabilizes in the long-run. Moreover, the model reproduces endogenous fluctuations of labor share
with a declining pattern for long time periods and we can ascribe this evidence to the directed
and biased technical change process. Indeed, the comparison between the baseline scenario with
the ‘counterfactual ’ scenario wherein a ‘neutral ’ technical progress is at work, confirms our hy-
pothesis showing weaker growth of both real-GDP and real consumption within the ‘innovation
bias’ scenario as well as persistent downswings in labor share and relatively higher unemployment
rate with respect to the ‘neutral innovation’ scenario. Of course, this is just a first step towards
the analysis of the interplay among biased technological change, employment, growth and income
distribution. Indeed, there are many aspects that should be further investigated starting from this
model. For instance, the analysis of technical progress implemented within the present model exclu-
sively considers process innovation in a closed-economy model, whereas further investigations could
also concern product innovation and competitiveness gaps between two (or even more) countries.
Such an approach would allows us to analyze, for instance, the non-convergence issues affecting the
core-periphery asymmetrical structure of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
26
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W Number of workers 1500
M Number of capitalists 100
Ψ Matching Parameter 10
A0 Firms’ initial net worth 10
u Wage revision probability parameter 2.0
ϕl0 Initial labor productivity (consumption firms) 1.0
ϕk0 Initial capital productivity (consumption firms) 1.0
aK Labor productivity (capital firms) 2.0
w0 Initial wage 1.0
p0 Initial consumption-good price 1.0
δ Adaptive parameter 0.03
ρ Share of dividends distributed 0.95
γ Share of R&D expenditure 0.03
ν R&D success probability parameter 1.0
µc,0 Consumption firms’ initial mark-up 0.2
µk,0 Capital firms’ initial mark-up 0.04
θ Inventories share parameter 0.2
κ Capital goods duration 20
δ1 Investment function profit rate weight 0.025
δ2 Investment function capacity utilization weight 0.025
r ’Normal’ profit rate 0.045
u ’Normal’ rate of capacity utilization 0.9
α1w Workers’ propensity to consume out of income 0.95
α2w Workers’ propensity to consume out of wealth 0.35
α1m Capitalists’ propensity to consume out of income 0.65
α2m Capitalists’ propensity to consume out of wealth 0.15
η Banks-firms minimum proportion 0.03
σ Banks’ minimum dimension relative to firms 4.0
µ1 Total credit supply parameter 20.0
32
µ2 Minimal reserve requirement parameter 0.1
χ Loan interest parameter 0.003
ιl Loans’ probability parameter 0.2
ιb Bonds’ probability parameter 0.1
τ0 Initial tax rate 0.4
G0 Initial public expenditure 0.4
ires Interest paid on banks’ reserves 0.001
ib0 Initial interest rate on bonds 0.001
ζ Deposit interest-discount rate ratio 0.1
33
